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THE EXPANSION OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER 
UNDER THE 1952 PATENT ACTg 
Robert Greene Sterne and Lawrence B. Bugaisky¼ 
I.  EXPANSION OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER UNDER THE 1952 
PATENT ACT 
It is quite surprising that a mere four words were sufficient to 
establish a fundamental framework for defining the categories of 
patentable inventions.  This framework has successfully stood for a 
period of more than 200 years.  The 1793 Patent Act1 defined the four 
classes of statutory subject matter as “art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition.”2  The 1952 Patent Act (“Patent Act” or “1952 Act”)3 
replaced the term “art” with “process,” resulting in the current language 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 
The legislative history of the Patent Act states that “art” as used in 
§ 101: “is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with 
 
 g  This paper was originally presented at the Fifth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium 
on Intellectual Property Law and Policy on March 10, 2003.  A database search has not found any 
significant decisions concerning statutory subject matter that have been decided since the original 
presentation.  An electronic version of the paper has been posted on the Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein 
& Fox, P.L.L.C., web site (www.skgf.com). 
 ¼  Robert Greene Sterne and Lawrence B. Bugaisky, Ph.D. are Directors with Sterne, 
Kessler, Goldstein & Fox, P.L.L.C., a Washington, D.C., intellectual property firm 
(www.skgf.com).  The authors express their appreciation for research assistance to Joe Ostroff and 
for the editorial assistance provided by Ken Bass of their firm.  This paper is intended to give an 
overview of the current state of the law and some discussion of how the authors believe future 
trends may develop.  The paper does not represent the views of the law firm or any of its present or 
former clients.  Copyright  2003 SKGF.  All Rights Reserved. 
 1. The Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318.  The 1793 Act was the successor to the 
first United States Patent Act of 1790.  1 Stat. 109.  There were subsequent patent statutes in 1836 
(Act of July 4, 1836), 5 Stat. 117; 1870, 16 Stat. 198; and 1874, 18 Stat. 78. 
 2. These categories were maintained through the subsequent Patent Acts until 1952. 29 Stat. 
692; 32 Stat. 1225; 45 Stat. 732; 46 Stat. 37; 53 Stat. 1212. 
 3. 66 Stat. 797 (Act of July 19, 1952). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).  “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  Id. 
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process or method.  The word ‘process’5 has been used to avoid the 
necessity of explanation that the word ‘art’ as used in this place means 
‘process or method.’”6 
Despite the absence of any substantial change in the statutory 
language, there has been a substantial expansion of the subject matter 
being claimed in issued U.S. patents over the last 50 years.  This 
expansion is the result of judicial interpretation of the essentially 
unchanged language of the Patent Act, and administrative guidelines 
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
The expansion of statutory subject matter appears to have been 
driven by two mutually reinforcing factors.  The first one, of course, is 
the accelerating pace of invention as technology continues to rapidly 
advance.  More importantly, however, is the fact that the 1952 Act did 
not include any express exclusionary limits on statutory subject matter.7 
One of the landmark cases concerning statutory subject matter was 
the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty8 that 
upheld the patentability of genetically engineered oil-eating bacteria.  
That decision resulted, at least in part, from the absence of express 
exclusionary language in the Patent Act.  The Court noted that “[i]n 
choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of 
matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws be given wide scope.”9 
In Chakrabarty, the Court further stated that “Congress employed 
broad general language in drafting [the Patent Act] precisely because . . . 
inventions are often unforeseeable.”10  Referring to the legislative 
history, the Court suggested that statutory subject matter should include 
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”11  After Chakrabarty, 
 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2002) further defines a process to mean “process, art or method.” 
 6. S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398-99. 
 7. While 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not specifically exclude specific types of subject matter as 
being non-statutory, the courts have.  For example, included in non-statutory subject matter are laws 
of nature, physical phenomena, a conceptual energy model and abstract ideas.  See In re Bonczyk, 
No. 01-1061, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9256 (Fed Cir. May 11, 2001); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 66 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed. Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 
127, 130 (1948).  Additional types of matter considered non-statutory by the courts include merely 
an idea, a principle in the abstract, an original cause, and a motive.  See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. 
Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853). 
 8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (describing the subject matter at issue 
as a “genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.  
Because of this property . . . Chakrabarty’s invention is believed to have significant value for the 
treatment of oil spills.”) 
 9. Id at 308. 
 10. Id at 316. 
 11. Id at 310 (quoting S. REP. NO.  82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394). 
2
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reference to statutory subject matter and “anything under the sun” 
appeared frequently in decisions.12  Thus, the absence of any express 
limitations on the four statutory categories has been the second basis for 
significant judicial expansion of allowable subject matter. 
One year after Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. 
Diehr13 considered a completely different technology: a “process” 
carried out using a computer with a stored program.14  As in 
Chakrabarty, the Court stated that “we have more than once cautioned 
that ‘courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and 
conditions which a legislature has not expressed.’”15  As a result, the 
process was found to be within the bounds of allowable statutory subject 
matter. 
The approach to patentable subject matter taken in the European 
Patent Convention contrasts starkly with that in the United States.  The 
Convention16 expressly excludes numerous categories of subject matter: 
(a) mere discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical models, (b) 
aesthetic creations, (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing 
mental acts, playing games or doing business and programs for 
computers, (d) presentation of information, (e) methods of treatment of 
the human or animal body, and (f) plant or animal varieties or essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals.17  Needless 
to say, this results in a decreased diversity in the types of subject matter 
 
 12. See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987). 
 13. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 182 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)). 
 16. European Patent Convention, Article 52 (1, 2 and 4).  The Convention states: 
Patentable Inventions. 
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of 
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step. 
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions with the meaning of 
paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic 
creation; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information . . . . 
. . .  
(4) Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body shall not be regarded as 
invention which are susceptible of industrial application . . . European Patent 
Convention, Article 53 (b), Exceptions to Patentability.  European patents shall not be 
granted in respect of: . . . (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological 
processes to the products thereof. 
Id. 
 17. Id. 
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found patentable compared to U.S. practice.18 
Issues concerning statutory subject matter first arise during ex parte 
proceedings in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  If 
a claim is not rejected on grounds of unallowable statutory subject 
matter by an examiner, the claimed subject matter becomes allowable 
statutory subject matter by administrative default.  In contrast, if the 
claim is rejected by the PTO and later considered on judicial review of 
the PTO rejection, additional statutory subject matter is in effect brought 
within the words of the Patent Act by judicial interpretation.  
Alternatively, it is possible that a claim that has been allowed by the 
PTO will be challenged after examination during infringement litigation 
on the grounds that it encompasses subject matter that is not within the 
language of the Patent Act. 
Statutory subject matter rejections have been raised by examiners 
against many different kinds of inventions including, but not limited to: 
medical treatment claims,19 printed matter,20 computer software,21 
business methods,22 kits,23 genetically-altered microorganisms,24 
intermediary or transitory products in compositions,25 and plant seeds.26  
Of course, this list is not all-inclusive.  In some instances, the so-called 
non-statutory subject matter became patentable after further 
consideration of examiners’ decisions by the courts or changes in the 
PTO rules. 
The concept of statutory subject matter has sometimes become 
muddy because in a number of instances the PTO has rejected claims for 
lack of statutory matter, when in fact the rejection should have been 
based on other provisions of the Patent Act.  These additional reasons 
for rejection include, but are not limited to, issues concerning 
 
 18. There is some commonality with regard to fundamental ideas, algorithms and other 
categories excluded from patenting in the United States as a result of judicial decisions.  See supra 
note 8. 
 19. Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107 (B.P.A.I. 1954).  While surgical techniques 
are considered patentable subject matter, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2001) (110 Stat. 
3009, September 30, 1996), providing remedies against medical practitioner and related health 
entities performing such an activity. 
 20. See In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, (C.C.P.A. 
1969). 
 21. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 22. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368. 
 23. In re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
 24. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1981). 
 25. In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A.1980). 
 26. Pioneer Hi-Bred. Int’l Inc. v. J.E.M. Agric. Supply, 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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enablement, written description, novelty and obviousness.27  
Analytically, these additional requirements do not function as narrowing 
restrictions on the classes of statutory matter.  Rather, the additional 
restrictions impose tests that the application must pass once it has passed 
through the initial door to patentability: meeting the statutory subject 
matter requirement. 
This article is not intended to provide a complete review of all cases 
involving the expansion of statutory subject matter since enactment of 
the 1952 Act.28  The attached table does, however, list a number of 
significant cases, and a few of these are briefly discussed below. 
II.  ALGORITHMS, SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER-RELATED ISSUES 
The law concerning the patentability of computer-related inventions 
and whether they are statutory matter has undergone a series of changes 
since the passage of the 1952 Act.  While the Supreme Court has not 
expressly overruled its prior decisions, an observer can readily conclude 
that the Justices have changed the scope of patentable subject matter in 
this area.  A series of decisions29 has resulted in an evolution away from 
an apparent absolute bar on patenting anything relating in any way to an 
algorithm.  This evolution now provides principles that allow patenting 
of such subject matter if there is a practical application for the algorithm 
or if it is associated with a tangible medium. 
Algorithms per se have long been held not to be statutory subject 
matter and the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Gottschalk v. Benson30 
essentially precluded patent protection for software per se, on the 
grounds that software programs are essentially only a collection of 
algorithms.  The Court, however, left the door open for the patenting of 
novel and non-obvious programming methods as well as software that 
was embodied in or used in connection with a mechanical device.31 
One example of the patenting of software that was associated with a 
machine was the automatic record-keeping system that banks could use 
to provide bookkeeping services on their statements that was considered 
 
 27. These other provisions include 35 U.S.C.S. § 102 (2002); 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (2002). 
 28. Extensive detailed treatment of statutory subject matter can be found in several treatises, 
such as D.S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01 (2002); M.A. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW 
PERSPECTIVES § 1.01 (2d ed. 2002). 
 29. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1981); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 30. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 72-73. 
 31. Id. at 73. 
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in In re Johnston.32  Those claims were allowed because they were 
drawn to a description of a machine that was controlled by an 
appropriately programmed digital computer rather than being drawn to 
the computer program itself.33  Similarly, a method for curing rubber that 
used as one of its steps a mathematical formula and a programmed 
computer was found to be patentable subject matter in Diamond v 
Diehr,34 where the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals’35 conclusion that patentability of the process should not 
be defeated merely because a mathematical formula was used. 
In 1994, the Federal Circuit described the concept of statutory 
subject matter for computer-related inventions as follows: 
[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical subject 
matter exception to [patentability] is to see whether the claimed subject 
matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept, whether 
categorized as a mathematical formula, mathematical equation, 
mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in essence represents 
nothing more than a ‘law of nature,’ ‘natural phenomenon,’ or 
‘abstract idea.’ If so, Diehr precludes the patenting of that subject 
matter. 
. . .  
 . . . This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be 
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to 
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.36 
The evolving justification for allowing patents for device-connected 
software, while disallowing them for software per se, formed the basis 
for the appeal in In re Beauregard.37  In that case, IBM challenged the 
PTO’s rejection of an application to patent software in the form of a 
program stored on computer media.38  IBM argued for an extension of 
the existing principles.39  After IBM’s brief was filed, the Commissioner 
of Patents decided to issue new examination guidelines for computer 
 
 32. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765  (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev’d on other grounds Dann v. Johnston, 
425 U.S. 219  (1976). 
 33. Id. at 771. 
 34. Dier, 450 U.S. at 192-93. 
 35. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the predecessor to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
 36. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 37. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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software.40  These new guidelines opened the existing doorway to 
patentability so wide that inventors can now, in effect, patent any 
computer software provided that it is embodied in a medium such as a 
diskette.41  That change, for all practical purposes, reversed the result of 
the Gottschalk decision. 
III.  PRINTED MATTER ISSUES 
Printed matter has historically not been considered statutory subject 
matter.  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), however, in 
1967 drew a distinction between “printed matter,” which has the primary 
purpose of conveying information to a reader, and “pattern areas” on a 
disc which actually functioned as a “structure.”42  The court further 
stated that it was “error to confuse the lines of a patent drawing . . . with 
functional elements of a mechanism which in use actuate other 
mechanisms.”43  Thus, while both algorithms per se and printed matter 
per se had been held outside the bounds of statutory subject matter, 
when either was used in a framework associated with a physical 
structure, they were found to be patentable statutory subject matter. 
IV.  BUSINESS METHODS 
A “business method,” which in the past had been considered non-
statutory either because it was printed matter or software, has recently 
been found to be statutory subject matter in State Street Bank.44  There, 
the Federal Circuit decided that determination of whether claims “are 
directed to subject matter within 35 U.S.C. § 101 should not turn on 
whether the claimed subject matter does ‘business’ instead of something 
else.”45 
V.  BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CHEMICAL RELATED ISSUES 
The modern era of biotechnology patenting opened with the 1980 
Chakrabarty46 decision that genetically manipulated bacteria was 
 
 40. Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 
(1996). 
 41. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584. 
 42. In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007, 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that “a dark area on a light base 
can be an element of structure”). 
 43. Id. at 1013. 
 44. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 45. Id. at 1377. 
 46. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1981). 
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statutory subject matter.  Subsequently, numerous biotechnology 
inventions, never previously deemed patentable, were granted patents.47  
As with other technologies, the patenting of biotechnology inventions 
has been facilitated by the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of 
potentially excludable matter.48 
The patenting of multicellular organisms had been an issue for 
some time, when in 1987, the PTO position on this matter was clarified49 
in an Official Gazette Notice and in 1988 when the “Harvard Mouse” 
became the first patented mammal.50  Today, patentable biotechnology 
includes genetically manipulated animals such as rats, pigs, sheep, and 
even genetically manipulated foods such as tomatoes, rice and corn. 
In general, determination of whether something in the 
biotechnology area falls within the parameters of statutory subject matter 
has not required further major decisions by the courts, but simply 
application of precedential decisions such as Chakrabarty.  One 
temporary exception to the trend of allowing patents under the Patent 
Act concerned multicellular plants which were initially considered to be 
non-allowable subject matter under § 101 because there were other 
statutes covering this intellectual property.51  A 1985 PTO decision52 and 
the 2000 Federal Circuit decision of Pioneer Hi-Bred53 clarified the 
issue and established that multicellular plants are indeed patentable 
subject matter under § 101.54 
The chemical area has also presented unique issues in terms of 
statutory subject matter.  The CCPA decision of In re Breslow55 
addressed the issue of whether an intermediary or transitory product 
could be considered statutory subject matter.  The Federal Circuit posed 
the question as “how long must a new and useful compound, which can 
 
 47. A detailed discussion of the patentability of biotechnology inventions has been published 
in IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW (West Group, 2001).  See also KENNETH J. 
BURCHFIELD, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (BNA Books, 1995). 
 48. See Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Rader, J., concurring). 
 49. “The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring non-human 
multicellular living organisms including  animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope 
of 35 U.S.C. Section 101.”  1077 O.G. 24 (April 21, 1987).  U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (Leder et al.) 
(issued April 12, 1988). 
 50. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (Leder et al.) (issued April 12, 1988). 
 51. Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA), 46 Stat. 376; The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 § 
42, 84 Stat. 1542, amended by 1994 Amendments, Publ. L. No. 103-349, § 3, 108 Stat. 3138, 7 
U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2002) 
 52. Ex parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985). 
 53. Pioneer Hi-Bred. Inc. v. J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
 54. Id. 
 55. In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
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be made at will for its intended purpose, . . . exist to be considered as a 
‘composition of matter’ under 35 U.S.C. § 101?”56  The court disagreed 
with the PTO’s attempt to “read into 35 U.S.C. § 101 a requirement that 
composition of matter must be stable.”57  This decision is consistent with 
decisions in other technology areas, where courts have broadly 
interpreted the Patent Act and refused to insert express limitations in 
considering what may potentially be statutory subject matter. 
VI.  THE FUTURE 
The Patent Act has served admirably well in permitting the 
continued expansion of statutory subject matter over the last 50 years 
and will presumably continue to do so without the need for significant 
change in the future.  The strength of the Patent Act has been its lack of 
specific exclusionary limitations, thereby permitting broad discretion in 
judicial interpretation.  The existing language of the Patent Act and the 
history of judicial interpretation, as well as recent PTO administrative 
guidelines, should result in continued expansion in what will be deemed 
patentable subject matter.  Based on this history, there appears to be no 
compelling reason why future patentable subject matter in any 
technology area cannot be addressed under the current statutory 
provision. 
As new technologies emerge, the PTO and the courts will need to 
address each new subject matter with an open mind.  The biggest 
problem in this regard, however, may be that new technologies can raise 
previously unencountered ethical, moral, economic and public policy 
issues that are analytically unrelated to a construction of the Patent Act 
but tend to “muddy” the analysis.58  It is essentially impossible to 
anticipate specific issues in advance because an invention is frequently 
the creation of something previously unimaginable.  Unimaginable 
things can create previously unimaginable issues for society. 
New issues relating to potential statutory subject matter may 
overlap into the arena of what should be patented, rather than what is 
actually patentable under the Patent Act.  In theory, such issues should 
not affect the patent examination process or a court’s determination of 
what is statutory subject matter.  Of course, the reality of the situation 
may ultimately be dictated by public policy concerns. 
As new technologies arise, they will need to be addressed on an 
 
 56. Id at 519. 
 57. Id. at 521. 
 58. Such an example might arise if someone tried to patent a cloned human being. 
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individual and innovative basis.  For example, the PTO issued a patent to 
a surgical method, thereby placing methods of practicing medicine into 
the statutory category.  Shortly thereafter, questions occurred from 
health practitioners to Congress concerning their ability to treat their 
patients without being sued for infringement.  The easiest solution might 
have been for either the courts or Congress to exclude such “surgical 
methods” from the category of statutory subject matter.  Instead, 
Congress provided a limited exemption from infringement liability to 
address the concerns of such health practitioners without changing the 
definition of patentable subject matter. 
This congressional remedy was a new provision in the Patent Act59 
that permitted health practitioners and health care facilities to engage in 
“medical activity”60 that infringed a patent without being sued for 
infringement.61  Therefore, one need not necessarily restrict the 
categories of statutory matter in order to address possible complications 
arising from new technologies. 
Another controversial statutory subject matter issue involves 
bioinformatics data that results from using sophisticated computer 
software to analyze biological research problems.  In this scenario, an 
inventor might mine a database of information regarding proteins or 
nucleic acids and arrive at a “virtual structure”62 having specific 
characteristics of interest.  Under current interpretations of § 101, the 
raw database and the derived virtual structures cannot be patented, but if 
the virtual structure is actually converted into a physical structure, it 
becomes patentable subject matter.  The problem with this current 
limitation is that much of the commercial investment, and resulting 
economic value, exists in the database itself and the virtual structures 
prior to any creation of the actual physical structure.  One can argue that 
if patent protection were provided to the database itself, or the more 
limited area of the virtual structures, advances in technology would be 
facilitated, business would benefit and the valuable database itself would 
 
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2001).  The Act reads in part: 
(c)(1)With respect  to medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) or this title, the provisions of 
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical 
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity. 
Id. 
 60. The amendment defined “medical activity” narrowly to encompass only “performance of 
a medical or surgical procedure on a body.” 35 U.S. § 287(c)(2)(A). 
 61. Of course, the practical result of this exemption to infringement may have been to 
significantly decrease the value of any patent issuing to such a surgical procedure. 
 62. In this context the “virtual structure” is a theoretical one that can be described in detail 
with respect to its structure and functional characteristics. 
10
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be disseminated more quickly into the public domain, thus preventing 
unnecessary research duplication. 63  Others might argue that allowing 
patent protection of data itself or virtual inventions would transform the 
Patent Act into an Intellectual Property Protection Act with undesirable 
consequences.  This debate is likely to become more intense as 
bioinformatics data becomes more prevalent in the research arena. 
Another topic recently discussed in the scientific press involves 
man-made devices that can by themselves “invent” new devices.  In one 
publication this concept was referred to as “genetic programming.”64  Is 
such a machine-created invention within the bounds of statutory subject 
matter?  If so, who is the “inventor”?  These and other questions wait for 
answers.  Needless to say, however, it is certain that there will be many 
other such new technologies that will need to be addressed in the next 
decade as to whether they constitute statutory subject matter under the 
Patent Act. 
 
 63. Under current law the database and virtual structures could be protected as trade secrets, 
but that avenue does not provide the facilitation of improvements that the patent system does. 
 64. See John R. Koza, Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Steeler, Evolving Inventions, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Feb. 2003, at 52.  At page 54 of this article, it is claimed that the authors 
have already filed for a patent on “a genetically evolved general-purpose controller that is superior 
to mathematically derived controllers commonly used in industry.”  Id. at 54.  The authors 
apparently used the adjective “genetic” because the controller “evolved” from a machine process in 
a manner analogous to Darwin’s concept of genetic evolution.  See id. 
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TABLE 1 - DECISIONS RELATING TO EXPANSION OF 
STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER 
 
Decision Comments Invention 
Ex parte Scherer, 
103 U.S.P.Q. 107 
(B.P.A.I. 1954). 
Overruled examiner’s 
decision preventing 
patentability. 
Medical treatment 
claims.  
In re Jones, 
373 F.2d 1007, 153 
U.S.P.Q. 77 (C.C.P.A. 
1967). 
Distinguished printed 
matter as a component 
of a machine. 
Code member with 
printed lines as part 
of an optical reader 
rotating disc.  
Gottscchalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 175 
U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972).  
Eliminated patent 
protection for computer 
software. 
Computer soft-ware 
per se (program for 
data processing). 
In re Johnston, 
502 F.2d 765, 183 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 172 
(C.C.P.A. 1974). 
The claimed machine 
was within the 
technological art. 
Record-keeping 
machine system. 
In re Venezia, 
530 F.2d 956, 189 
U.S.P.Q. 149 (C.C.P.A. 
1976). 
Group of interrelated 
parts was a 
manufacture. 
Kit with com-ponent 
parts, assembled in 
the field. 
Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584, 198 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 
(1981). 
Process was not 
patentable. 
Process using math-
ematical formula 
and a programmed 
digital computer. 
In re Kratz, 
592 F.2d 1169, 201 
U.S.P.Q. 71 (CCPA 
1979). 
Alteration to products 
from natural state – 
manufacture. 
Process-product 
imparting a straw-
berry flavor by add-
ing certain acids. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 206 
U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980). 
Anything under the sun 
that is made by man. 
Genetically-altered, 
live microorganism 
(oil eating bacteria). 
In re Breslow, 
616 F.2d 516, 205 
U.S.P.Q. 221 (C.C.P.A. 
1980). 
 
Court rejected the idea 
that an unstable, inter-
mediate or transitory 
product did not con-
stitute a composition 
under §101. 
Intermediary or 
transitory product 
(composition).  
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Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175, 209 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 
(1981). 
Court confirmed the 
patentability of an 
industrial process that 
included the use of a 
mathematical formula 
and a computer as one 
of its steps. 
Process (method of 
operating a rubber 
molding press) 
including a math-
ematical formula 
and a computer. 
In re Gulack, 
703 F.2d 1381, 217 
U.S.P.Q. 401 (Fed. 
Cir.1983). 
Printed matter issue. Device with a series 
of numbers func-
tionally related to a 
ring. 
Ex parte Allen, 
2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 
(B.P.A.I. 1987). 
PTO extended protect-
ion to a multi-cellular 
organism that is non-
naturally occurring.  
Altered oysters (pro-
duct by process). 
In re Lowry, 
32 F.3d 1579, 32 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (Fed. 
Cir 1994). 
The invention was not 
printed matter. 
Data structure for 
storing, using and 
managing data in a 
computer memory. 
In re Beauregard, 
53 F.3d 1583, 35 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1383 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
Computer program em-
bodied in tangible med-
ium such as a floppy 
disc was patentable. 
Tangible media with 
computer imp-
lemented method 
embedded within. 
State St. Bank & Trust v. 
Signature Fin. Group, 
149 F.3d 1368, 47 
U.S.P.Q. 1596 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
Determination of 
statutory subject matter 
should not turn on 
whether the invention 
does “business” rather 
than something else. 
Data processing 
system for making 
necessary daily 
calculations. 
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